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Abstract 
Efficiency Effects of Quality of Service and 
Environmental Factors: Experience from 
Norwegian Electricity Distribution 
EPRG Working Paper    1025 
Cambridge Working Paper in Economics  1050 
Christian Growitsch, Tooraj Jamasb, and Heike 
Wetzel  
 
Since the 1990s, efficiency and benchmarking analysis has increasingly 
been used in network utilities research and regulation. A recurrent 
concern is the effect of environmental factors that are beyond the 
influence of firms (observable heterogeneity) and factors that are not 
identifiable (unobserved heterogeneity) on measured cost and quality 
performance of firms. This paper analyses the effect of geographic and 
weather factors and unobserved heterogeneity on a set of 128 
Norwegian electricity distribution utilities for the 2001-2004 period. We 
utilize data on almost 100 geographic and weather variables to identify 
real economic inefficiency while controlling for observable and 
unobserved heterogeneity. We use the factor analysis technique to 
reduce the number of environmental factors into few composite 
variables and to avoid the problem of multi-collinearity. We then 
estimate the established stochastic frontier models of Battese and Coelli 
(1992; 1995) and the recent true fixed effects models of Greene (2004; 
2005) without and with environmental variables. In the former models 
some composite environmental variables have a significant effect on the 
performance of utilities. These effects vanish in the true fixed effects 
models. However, the latter models capture the entire unobserved 
heterogeneity and therefore show significantly higher 
average efficiency scores. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the 1990s, the use of incentive-based regulation in network industries has 
been on the rise in tandem with the liberalisation trend in infrastructure sectors. 
While market mechanisms have been introduced in the potentially competitive 
activities, incentive-based regulation models have sought to improve the 
efficiency of the natural monopoly segments of these sectors. 
 
The electricity sector presents a comprehensive example of implementation of 
liberalisation in network industries. Initially, the focus of the early electricity 
sector reforms was mainly on implementing competition in the wholesale 
generation and retail supply activities. Meanwhile incentive regulation of the 
natural monopoly transmission and distribution networks may be characterised 
as an afterthought (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007). Some regulatory authorities, 
inspired by the notion of yardstick regulation first presented by Shleifer (1985) 
have adopted benchmarking methods as part of the regulatory proceedings. 
These methods are based on parametric efficiency and productivity analysis 
techniques stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), and corrected ordinary least 
squares (COLS), and the non-parametric technique data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) (see Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). 
 
However, it soon became evident that there is a potential conflict in the use of 
incentive regulation and provision of quality of service. Both theoretical 
arguments presented (e.g. Spence, 1975) and empirical findings (e.g. Ter-
Martirosyan, 2003) have suggested that, in the absence of specific arrangements, 
incentive regulation will lead to reduced quality of service and the outcome will 
deviate from the socio-economic optimum. Therefore, some studies have argued 
that incentive regulation and/or benchmarking models should also incorporate 
quality of service (Giannakis et al., 2005; Growitsch et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2009a). 
 
Moreover, the use of benchmarking techniques in regulation has given rise to the 
issue that comparisons of firms and their relative efficiency measures should 
also take the effect of firm-specific non-discretionary factors – factors that are 
beyond the control of the management – into account. Such factors include 
economic, regulatory, geographical, climatic and other conditions that can affect 
the cost and quality of service performance of utilities. It is, however, 
problematic to ex-ante establish which non-discretionary factors are relevant or 
how they should be taken into account. There are sound arguments as to how 
some of these factors can influence the cost and quality performance of utilities. 
At the same time, it can be argued that, in the long run, utilities adapt, at least to 
some extent, to their operating environment and the effect of non-discretionary 
factors on their performance diminishes. 
 
Weather and geographic conditions are among the most commonly debated 
factors perceived to be affecting the performance of utilities. There are 
alternative methods on how to include non-discretionary factors such as 
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geography into benchmarking models (Yang and Pollitt, 2007). While the effect 
of environmental factors on utility performance is of academic and regulatory 
interest there is rather limited evidence on the nature and extent of their effect. 
 
This paper analyses the effect of geographic and weather conditions (observable 
heterogeneity) on the cost and quality performance of the Norwegian electricity 
distribution network utilities. We use a panel of economic and technical data for 
128 distribution networks for the period from 2001 to 2004 together with nearly 
100 geographic and weather factors in their service area. In order to reduce the 
number of environmental variables to a manageable number and to avoid the 
problem of multicollinearity, we estimate composite ‘factors’ for the geographic 
and weather conditions applying factor analysis. We then incorporate the 
estimated factors into an efficiency analysis of the utilities. In order to analyse 
the effect of controlling for firm specific observable and unobserved 
heterogeneity on the efficiency estimates, we estimate the established stochastic 
frontier models of Battese and Coelli (1992,1995) and the recent true fixed effect 
model of Greene (2004,2005) with and without the composite factors. The next 
section briefly discusses the regulation of electricity distribution utilities in 
Norway. Section 3 presents the methodology used in the analysis. Section 4 
presents and discusses the results. Section 5 is the conclusions. 
 
 
2. The Norwegian Electricity Reform and Distribution 
Networks 
 
Norway was one of the pioneering countries in implementing market-oriented 
electricity sector reforms. The Norwegian reform was enacted in the Energy Act 
of 1990 and came into effect in 1991 following Chile (in 1982) and the United 
Kingdom (in 1990). The reform involved a structural change in the sector by 
unbundling of the transmission and distribution networks from the potentially 
competitive generation and supply functions. The Norwegian reform, unlike in 
some other countries such as the UK, did not involve privatization of the sector 
which is predominantly under local (municipal/county) and state ownership. 
 
At the time of reform there were 70 generation and 230 distribution network 
utilities in operation (Bye and Hope, 2005). The large number of utilities is 
mainly the result of dispersed hydroelectric resources and the established role of 
local politics in the country. As it became evident later, this was an advantage in 
introducing competition in generation and implementing advanced 
benchmarking methods in incentive regulation of networks. The dominant public 
ownership of the sector did not represent a major obstacle in the introducing of 
the reform though it may have somewhat slowed down the introduction of 
competition (Magnus, 2000). 
 
Norway was also among the first countries to introduce benchmarking and 
incentive-based regulation. Initially, the distribution utilities operated under a 
rate of return (ROR) regulation regime. The first incentive regulation of these 
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utilities was introduced in 1997 which used efficiency benchmarking of the 
utilities based on the DEA technique.1  
 
Despite its theoretical and conceptual appeal, electricity regulators have not 
explicitly integrated quality of service in their benchmarking exercise. A notable 
exception is, however, Norway which introduced quality-dependent revenue 
caps already in 2001 (Heggset et al., 2001; Langset et al., 2001). Norway is also 
the only country that explicitly incorporates quality of service in the form of the 
cost of non-delivered energy from estimated customer willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
as an integrated part of the benchmarking exercise and incentive regulation of 
distribution networks in 2001. 
 
Since 2007, the Norwegian regulator for water and energy NVE has adopted 
annual distribution price controls which are partly based on benchmarking 
analysis. The regulator has also analysed a large number of geographic and 
weather variables and has applied the SFA technique to construct composite 
indices from few selected variables. The actual benchmarking used utilizes 
measures of snow, forest, and coastal climate as output variables in the DEA 
model (see NVE, 2006a, 2006b). Hence the model assumes that these affect the 
firms’ production function (rather than efficiency). To control for effects which 
influence the efficiency level rather than the production technology, the 
regulator uses a second-stage regression to estimate the efficiency effect of the 
number of connections to regional networks, capacity of distributed generation 
sources connected to the network, and the number of islands in the service area.  
 
Although, from a technical point of view, distribution networks can be regarded 
as relatively simple activities, there is no consensus in the academic literature or 
among the regulatory practitioners as how to model this activity.2 In particular, it 
is often argued that some potentially important contextual and environmental 
factors that are likely to affect the cost and quality of service of the utilities are 
not included in the benchmarking models. Norway is the only country where the 
regulator has systematically examined the effects of environmental factors on 
the performance of the quality of service and reflected these in the 
benchmarking models. 
 
Given the above context, Norway represents a particularly interesting case to 
study the effect of environmental factors. Firstly, the Norwegian sector has been 
under incentive regulation for a number of years. Second, the incentive 
regulation regime has removed much of the managerial inefficiency of the 
networks (Førsund and Kittelsen, 1998; Edvardsen et al., 2006). Third, unlike 
most other countries, the Norwegian electricity sector consists of a large, though 
declining due to mergers and acquisitions, number of network utilities which 
enable the use of analytical methods. And forth, the Norwegian regulator 
                                                 
1 See Edvardsen et al. (2006) for more details of benchmarking and regulation of quality of 
service in Norway. 
2 See Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) for a review of the benchmarking in electricity distribution 
networks and Jamasb and Pollitt (2003) for an overview of the variables used in benchmarking 
and efficiency studies. 
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publishes the external cost of quality (cost of energy not supplied) which allows 
a more comprehensive analysis of a utility’s efficiency. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
This section describes the methodology we apply and our estimation approach. 
First, we present the use of factor analysis in this study. Second, we provide a 
brief overview of (input) distance functions and their use in efficiency analysis. 
Subsequently, we describe our estimation methodology based on parametric SFA 
technique. 
 
3.1 Factor analysis 
 
Modeling and analysis of the effect of non-discretionary factors on the utilities’ 
performance is not straightforward. Yang and Pollitt (2007) present an overview 
of the main approaches to treatment of non-discretionary factors. The number of 
potentially relevant factors can be large. Also, the selection of appropriate 
variables needs to be justified. In particular, in the non-parametric technique of 
DEA an increase in the number of variables leads to the ‘dimensionality’ issue.3 
Selection of non-discretionary variables has often been based on received 
experience or ex ante cost driver analysis. With regards to the choice and 
analysis of the effect of non-discretionary factors the approaches vary from ex 
ante analysis and in-model inclusion to different types of ex post analysis of 
efficiency results. In parametric techniques such as SFA the independent 
variables can be examined for possible multi-collinearity which can result in 
leaving out some of the highly correlated variables. 
 
An alternative approach to analyze the effects of a large number of non-
discretionary variables is to reduce these into a limited number of composite 
factors. A useful approach to achieve this is to use factor analysis (FA). FA is a set 
of multivariate statistical techniques that analyses the interdependencies 
between a set of related variables in order to extract a smaller number of 
composite factors. Econometrically, FA identifies a number of latent constructs 
that explain the variance shared by a set of variables. That is, factor extraction is 
based only on the variance that is shared among a set of observed variables and 
excludes any unique and error variances form the solution. In contrast, principal 
component analysis (PCA), another frequently used data reduction technique, 
extracts components on the basis of all variance. The question of when one of the 
two techniques is to be preferred is not fully agreed upon among statistical 
theorists. Some argue in favor of FA, while others argue in favor of PCA, and still 
others argue that there is almost no difference between the two techniques 
(Costello and Osborn, 2005). As we consider a set of weather and geographical 
                                                 
3 That is, as the number of variables increases, the dimensionality of the model increases. This in 
turn reduces the discriminatory power of the model when measuring the relative efficiency 
among the observations in the sample. 
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variables, where measurement errors and outliers in the date might result in a 
relatively high portion of error and unique variance in total variance, we choose 
the FA technique. 
 
FA is a particularly useful technique for efficiency analysis involving geographic 
and weather conditions. These factors constitute and interact within a complex 
system with causal effects. Therefore, the use of composite factors rather than 
elimination of some seemingly correlated variables preserve the holistic nature 
of geographic and weather systems. Despite its apparent benefits only a small 
number of non-parametric efficiency studies have applied FA to address the 
dimensionality issue and to introduce statistical inference in the analysis 
(Wheelock and Wilson, 2001; Wilson and Carey, 2004; Yu, et al., 2009b). To the 
best of our knowledge, FA has not been used in parametric efficiency analysis, 
before. 
 
We aim to examine the effect of weather and geographic variables on 
performance of the utilities. The data available includes 95 such variables. As we 
have no prior knowledge of which variables or combinations represent the 
underlying factor structure and we found significant multicollinearity we use 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to narrow down and group the relevant ones.4  
 
In order to decide how many factors to retain we apply two tests. First, using the 
Kaiser criterion we drop all factors associated with eigenvalues lower than 
unity.5 As this criterion leads to a rather high number of factors, we additionally 
apply the Scree test. This graphical method suggest to plot the factors against 
their eigenvalues in descending order (Scree plot) and to retain only the 
important factors with large eigenvalues represented by data points above the 
break in the slope of the plot. All other factors with lower eigenvalues are 
considered as unimportant and can be dropped.  
 
Ultimately, we retain 7 factors which cumulatively explain more than 71 % of the 
shared variance of the data (see Appendix). We estimate the factor loadings (the 
correlation between observed variables and factors) through extraction and use 
varimax (orthogonal) rotation to maximize the difference between two factors. 
Finally, we use the Bartlett scoring to obtain factor scores for any single 
observation.6  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Another type of FA is the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). This approach is used if a 
predefined assumption on the relationship between the observed variables and the underlying 
factor structure exists. CFA then tests this assumption on the basis of an a priori specified factor 
model.  
5 Eigenvalues indicate the proportion of variance explained by each factor. 
6 Due to the high number of variables, we omitted tables of factor loadings and Bartlett scores. 
Information is available from the authors upon request. 
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3.2 Distance functions and stochastic frontier analysis 
 
In order to determine whether and how observable and unobservable 
heterogeneity influence utilities’ cost-quality performance, we measure firm-
specific technical (cost) efficiency within a parametric input distance function 
framework. The results can be interpreted as inefficiency due to over-usage of 
costs. Distance functions were first introduced by Shephard (1953) and can be of 
input or output orientation. While an input distance function seeks a production 
technology’s minimal proportional contraction of the input vector for a given 
output vector, an output distance function maximizes the output vector, given an 
input vector. 
 
The use of input distance functions in modelling electricity distribution is 
common, since output use (i.e. network services) is a derived demand and is 
exogenously determined by final customers’ electricity demand. Further, we 
apply an input distance function approach in this study, as it allows the 
estimation of firm-specific inefficiency even when availability of input price data 
is limited. In such cases, a distance function approach is superior to the 
estimation of a cost function (Coelli et al., 2005).  
 
An input distance function can be defined as  
                                 )},()/(:max{),( yLxyxD I                                     (1) 
where the input set L(y) represents all input vectors x that can produce the 
output vector y, and   measures the proportional reduction of the input vector 
x. Färe and Primont (1995) show that the following properties hold for an input 
distance function: DI (x,y): 
 
 linearly homogeneous in x, 
 non-decreasing in x and non-increasing in y, 
 concave in x and quasi-concave in y, and 
 if x  L(y), then DI (x,y)   1, with DI (x,y) = 1, if x is on the frontier of the 
input set. 
 
Based on the above, we are able to measure input-oriented technical efficiency 
(TE). Following Farrell (1957), firm specific technical efficiency can be defined 
as: 
                                     TE = 1/ DI (x,y), where 0  TE  1.                                      (2) 
Technical efficiency is measured as the reciprocal of the value of the distance 
function. A firm operating on the frontier shows a value of the input distance 
function of 1 (e.g. Balk, 1998) and an efficiency score of 1, likewise (fully 
efficient). As noted above, the efficiency scores obtained in this study are 
denoted technical cost efficiency, as all inputs used represent the firms’ costs. 
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We estimate a parametric input distance function in a translog functional form. 
Introduced by Christensen et al. (1973), it represents a generalization of the 
Cobb-Douglas functional form. Our translog input distance function with K inputs 
and M outputs is parameterized as: 
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Inputs and output are as presented above; t represents a time trend to cover 
technical change and itv  is a random error term. Subscripts i (i = 1,2,…,N) and t (t 
= 1,2,…,T) denote firm and time period respectively. The parameters to be 
estimated are , , , and . 
 
To facilitate the interpretation of the first-order translog parameters we 
normalize all the variables by their sample median. Homogeneity of degree one 
in inputs is imposed by the constraints  
            ).,...,2,1(),,...,2,1(,0 ,0 ,1
K
1k
km
1l
K
1k
k MmKk
K
kl  

    (4) 
Symmetry is given if the second order coefficients satisfy  
                 ).,...,2,1,(),,...,2,1,(,, MnmKlklkklnmmn                 (5) 
In this study, we apply the SFA techniques to estimate the presented translog 
input distance function, and to obtain measures for firm-individual inefficiency. 
The input distance function in Equation 3 is transformed into an econometric 
model which can be estimated directly. Imposing homogeneity by deflating K-1 
inputs by the K-th input leads to: 
                               .,,lnlnlnln itmitKitkitKit
I
it vtyxxgxD                     (6) 
Here, g(.) represents the translog functional form. To estimate the distance 
function, this expression is rearranged as  
                               ,,,lnlnln ititmitKitkitKit uvtyxxgx                       (7) 
where Iitit Du ln   represents the non-negative technical inefficiency. 
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3.3 Estimation strategy 
 
In order to estimate the translog input distance function and to measure firm-
specific efficiency, we apply models which allow for time-varying inefficiency 
following Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995) and Greene (2004, 2005). The models 
differ in their ability to account for unobserved and observable heterogeneity, 
and, hence, model comparisons allow analysing the effect of controlling for 
different kinds of heterogeneity on the efficiency estimates. 
 
For a translog input distance function the Battese and Coelli 1992 model (BC 
1992) takes the shape of Equation (7), where itv  is a normally distributed 
random error term    ( ),0(~ 2vit Niidv  ), and the inefficiency term itu is assumed 
to be an exponential function of time. That is,  
               ,,...,2,1,,...,2,1,)]}({exp[ TtNiuTtu iit                              (8) 
where   is an unknown parameter to be estimated, and iu  is assumed to follow a 
non-negative truncated normal distribution ( ),(~ 2ui Niidu 
 ). This model 
incorporates neither observable heterogeneity nor unobserved heterogeneity. It 
serves as our basic model. 
 
Compared to the BC 1992 model, the Battese and Coelli 1995 model (BC 1995) 
accounts for observable heterogeneity by modeling the mean of the inefficiency 
term it as a function of the estimated composite factors itz . That is, 
                                        ,' itit z                                                                 (9) 
where '  is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. The time variant 
inefficiency term itu  is assumed to follow a non-negative truncated normal 
distribution    ( ),(~ 2uitit Niidu 
 ). 
 
The third model, the true fixed effects (TFE) model of Greene, accounts for 
unobserved heterogeneity additionally. Compared to both Battese and Coelli 
models, the TFE model avoids the interpretation of unobserved heterogeneity as 
inefficiency and therefore upward biased inefficiency estimates. Rather, it may 
underestimate inefficiency if (a part of) inefficiency is persistent over time. For a 
translog input distance frontier, the TFE model can be defined as 
                  ,,,lnlnln ititmitKitkitiKit uvtyxxgx                             (10) 
where i represents a firm-specific fixed-effect that accounts for company 
characteristics that are not captured by the included variables. The assumed 
distributions of the error term itv  and the inefficiency term itu  are as before and 
the firm-specific fixed effect i  is assumed to enter the mean of the inefficiency 
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term it . We estimate two variants of this model (i.e. TFE 1 and TFE 2). While the 
TFE 1 model accounts for unobserved heterogeneity only, TFE 2 incorporates 
both observable and unobserved heterogeneity. That is, in TFE 2 the estimated 
composite factors itz also appear in the mean of the inefficiency term: 
                                          .' itiit z                                                      (11) 
All model estimates are obtained by maximum likelihood estimation techniques. 
As only the composed error term ititit uv  is observed, the firm’s inefficiency 
is estimated by the conditional mean of the inefficiency term ]|[ˆ ititit uEu   
(Jondrow et al. 1982). Finally, the annual firm-specific technical cost efficiency is 
calculated by )ˆexp( itit uTCE  .  
 
3.4 Data 
 
The data set used in this study is a balanced panel for 128 Norwegian 
distribution utilities for the years 2001 to 2004. We specify a simple model with 
one input and two outputs. Following the Norwegian benchmarking approach, 
we incorporate quality of service into our model by using social costs as a single 
input in monetary terms. Social costs are the sum of total production costs 
(operating expenditures and capital expenditures) and external quality costs. 
External quality costs are calculated by multiplying the amount of energy (KWh) 
not supplied with the estimated customer willingness-to-pay per unit of energy. 
The two outputs are the number of final customers and energy supplied measure 
in megawatt-hours (MWh). As noted by Neuberg (1977), these two variables 
reflect the different marketable goods of the joint service of electricity 
distribution.  
 
Tables 1 and 2 show the descriptive statistics and the average development over 
time for the relevant variables. As shown in Table 1, quality costs are comparably 
low. On average, they account for about 3 percent of the social cost. This result 
suggests a level of quality comparably close to the customers’ preferences. 
 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Social cost (€’000) 512     77 830    168 191    5 045    1 598 890 
Total cost (€’000) 512     75 443    163 018    4 949    1 561 140 
Quality cost (€’000) 512       2 388        6 058           9         88 463 
Final customers (No) 512     20 169      53 409       925       516 339 
Energy supplied (MWh) 512   533 895 1 497 244  16 504 15 482 400 
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However, as shown in Table 2, quality cost slightly increased over time, while 
total cost (private production cost) and social cost decreased. If the firms 
increase their quality of service we would observe exactly the opposite 
development: an increase in total cost as a results of more infrastructure 
investments or higher operating and maintenance efforts, and a decrease in 
quality cost as a result of a lower amount of energy not supplied. Hence, these 
results indicate that the social cost, the sum of total cost and quality cost, for 
supplying lower quality of service are lower than the social cost for an increase 
in quality of service. 
 
Table 2: Annual averages 
 
In addition to the input and output variables we incorporate a variety of weather 
and geographic variables in our analysis. Altogether, the data available includes 
95 such variables which are reduced to 7 composite factors by utilizing FA (cp. 
Section 3.1). Table 3 provides a summarized overview on the variables used in 
this analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean 2001 Mean 2002 Mean 2003 Mean 2004 
Social cost (€’000)   78 280   79 677   77 084   76 281 
Total cost (€’000)   76 225   77 813   73 814   73 919 
Quality cost (€’000)     2 055    1 863    3 270    2 363 
Final customers (No)   20 034   20 083   20 210   20 344 
Energy supplied (MWh) 562 875 544 059 504 835 523 809 
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Table 3: Geographic and weather variables 
Weather conditions 
 Precipitation (annual rainfall, annual snowfall, highest observed daily rainfall, highest 
observed daily snowfall, …)                             
 Temperature (annual average temperature, lowest daily average temperature, 
highest daily average temperature, …) 
 Wind speeds (average wind speeds, lowest wind speeds, highest wind speeds, …) 
 Lightning (number of lightnings, average strength of lightnings, …) 
 … 
Geographic conditions 
 Altitude above sea level (average altitude, lowest altitude, highest altitude) 
 Distance to coast (average distance, minimum distance, maximum distance) 
 Slope  (average slope, minimum slope, maximum slope) 
 Forest structure (share of coniferous forest with high/low/medium production 
potential, share of mixed forest with high/low/medium production potential, …) 
 Population concentration (share of small towns, share of town centers, share of 
dense areas, …) 
 Share of forest, share of agriculture area, share of wetland, share of shallow soil, 
share of water/lake 
 Mini/micro power plants (number of mini/micro power plants, total effect of 
mini/micro power plants, …) 
 … 
 
 
4. Results 
 
In order to compare the effect of the choice of model on results we adopt a 
stepwise approach. We first use the utility data to estimate the established 
Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995) models. These models can serve as a reference 
for subsequent models. The first model, the BC 1992 model, does not include the 
composite geographic and weather factors estimated from the FA. It is a one 
input and two output model with negative social cost as the dependent variable.  
 
As shown in the second column of Table 4 the first order coefficients of outputs, 
number of customers and energy supplied, are statistically significant and have 
the expected signs. Using the expression γ = λ2 / (1+λ2) = σu2 / σ2 the gamma (γ) 
value is 0.9225 – that is, about 92 percent of total variations in cost are due to 
technical cost inefficiency. This implies that the share of random error in total 
variations in cost is small. As shown in Table 5, the estimated average efficiency 
scores are comparably low.  
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Table 4: Empirical resultsa,b 
Variable BC 1992 BC 1995 TFE 1 TFE 2 
y1 
-0.5951*** 
(0.0440) 
-0.6847*** 
(0.0441) 
-0.6965*** 
(0.1005) 
-0.6292*** 
(0.1191) 
y2 
-0.2557*** 
(0.0359) 
-0.2148*** 
(0.0417) 
-0.2171*** 
(0.0693) 
-0.2359*** 
(0.0988) 
y1y1 
-0.1899 
(0.1850) 
-0.3044 
(0.2237) 
0.0170 
(0.3156) 
0.0859 
(0.4144) 
y1y2 
0.2720* 
(0.1602) 
0.2062 
(0.1919) 
0.1016 
(0.2866) 
-0.1493 
(0.3772) 
y2y2 
-0.3885*** 
(0.1435) 
-0.1428 
(0.1679) 
-0.2201 
(0.2692) 
0.1770 
(0.3530) 
t 
-0.0144** 
(0.0060) 
-0.0123* 
(0.0068) 
-0.0143*** 
(0.0042) 
-0.0118* 
(0.0067) 
tt 
0.0262*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0204 
(0.0144) 
0.0221*** 
(0.0076) 
0.0234** 
(0.0115) 
Constant 
0.3744*** 
(0.0279) 
0.1930*** 
(0.0282) 
0.2047*** 
(0.0530) 
0.1139 
(0.1086) 
Factor 1  
0.0433*** 
(0.0101) 
 
0.0432 
(2.0478) 
Factor 2  
-0.0086 
(0.0092) 
 
-0.0261 
(58.411) 
Factor 3  
-0.0121 
(0.0138) 
 
0.0467 
(79.455) 
Factor 4  
0.0672*** 
(0.0111) 
 
0.0637 
(73.918) 
Factor 5  
-0.2527*** 
(0.0160) 
 
-0.2457 
(29.414) 
Factor 6  
0.0094 
(0.0096) 
 
0.0020 
(5.3645) 
Factor 7  
0.0092 
(0.0088) 
 
0.0269 
(28.286) 
Constant 
0.4359*** 
(0.0373) 
0.2327*** 
(0.0299) 
0.1482 
(0.6751) 
0.1491 
(55.450) 
Sigma2 0.0515 0.0266 0.0052 0.0086 
Gamma 0.9225 0.5459 0.3654 0.3256 
Sigma_u2 0.0475 0.0145 0.0019 0.0028 
Sigma_v2 0.0040 0.0121 0.0033 0.0058 
a All maximum likelihood estimates of the models are obtained by using the software 
packages Frontier 4.1 and Limdep 9.0. b Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
***,**, and *: Significant on the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-level. 
 
 
In a second step we estimate the BC 1995 model. This model accounts for the 
impact of environmental factors on the utilities’ performance by allowing the 
inefficiency term it  to be a function of the composite geographic and weather 
factors estimated from the FA. Three out of the seven composite factors are 
found to be significant. In Factor 1 and 4 the highest loadings are carried by 
several wind speed and snowfall variables, respectively. Hence, the significant 
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and positive coefficients of these factors suggest that a higher wind and snowfall 
intensity leads to an increase in maintenance cost and, therefore, to a higher 
technical cost inefficiency.  
 
In Factor 5, the highest loadings are observed for variables that describe the 
population concentration. The significant and negative coefficient of Factor 5 
therefore indicates a lower technical cost inefficiency for firms operating in an 
area with a higher population concentration. Compared to the BC 1992 model, 
the average efficiency score increased by more than 10 percentage points (Table 
6). This result indicates that a notable share of the inefficiencies that we initially 
estimated with our basic model can be interpreted as being beyond managerial 
control. 
 
In the next step of our analysis we estimate two versions of the TFE model as 
described in the method section above. In our first specification (TFE 1) we only 
use social cost as the single input and normal outputs leaving out the 
environmental factors. In our second specification (TFE 2) we extend the model 
by allowing the inefficiency term it  to be a function of the estimated composite 
factors and the firm-specific fixed effects capturing unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
As can be seen in Table 4, in both TFE models the first order coefficients of the 
outputs are significant and have the correct signs.7 However, in the TFE 2 model 
none of the included composite factors is significant. Referring to the efficiency 
estimates, the results from the TFE models show rather high efficiency scores 
(Table 5). Such increase in scores is generally expected from these models (cp. 
Farsi et al., 2005). Our results show that, in this case, this increase is not due to 
inclusion of the composite geographic and weather factors in the model.  
 
Table 5: Efficiency scores by model and year 
Year BC 1992 BC 1995 TFE 1 TFE 2 
2001 0.6494 0.7630 0.8477 0.8508 
2002 0.6473 0.7616 0.8480 0.8505 
2003 0.6452 0.7594 0.8485 0.8496 
2004 0.6430 0.7587 0.8481 0.8485 
2001-2004 0.6462 0.7607 0.8481 0.8498 
 
However, the wide range of scores between the Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995) 
models and the TFE models justify further studies into the sources of differences. 
In particular it is important to determine the extent to which TFE models may 
reflect time-invariant inefficiency elements. Applying a series of mean 
comparison tests shows that all but the two TFE models produce significantly 
different efficiency scores. The development of scores over time is, however, not 
significant for any of the estimators. 
 
                                                 
7 Coefficients for firm-specific time-invariant fixed-effect dummy variables are not included due 
to space limitation. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
As efficiency and benchmarking analysis are increasingly used in network 
industries and utilities research and regulatory context a recurrent concern is 
whether environmental factors affect the firms’ performance or the choice of 
appropriate models. In this paper we present an empirical analysis of the effect 
of geographic and weather factors on the performance of the Norwegian 
electricity distribution utilities. Norway is a suitable case for such a study as it 
has a large number of utilities and detailed data of an extensive range geographic 
and weather conditions of the utilities service areas are available. 
 
We used FA to reduce the number of environmental factors from nearly one 
hundred to only seven composite factors. We first estimated conventional SFA 
models with and without the composite factors as reference point. We found that 
incorporating environmental factors did increase average efficiency by more 
than ten percentages points. We then estimated the recently developed TFE 
models first without and then with the composite factors included. As in other 
studies using such models we found significantly higher average efficiency scores 
in both models. However, at the same time, we did neither find one 
environmental factor to be significant nor a noticeable difference in the average 
efficiency scores of the two models. This result indicates that the whole impact of 
the environmental factors is captured by the firm-specific fixed effects or, in 
other words, is completely covered by unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
On the whole, the results suggest that the choice of the type of SFA model is more 
important than whether to include the environmental factors in them. Moreover, 
the difference between the levels of average efficiency scores between the 
conventional and the TFE SFA models imply that we need to be aware of the 
extent to which time-invariant inefficiencies may be embodied in the efficiency 
scores of the latter model types. This is in particular important for their use in 
regulatory benchmarking.   
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Graph A1: Scree plot of eigenvalues 
 
 
Table A1: Results of Factor Analysis 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 19.62557 4.55790 0.2180 0.2180 
Factor 2 15.06768 5.05379 0.1674 0.3854 
Factor 3 10.01388 1.62706 0.1112 0.4966 
Factor 4 8.38682 3.28869 0.0932 0.5898 
Factor 5 5.09813 1.73995 0.0566 0.6464 
Factor 6 3.35819 0.21618 0.0373 0.6837 
Factor 7 3.14201 0.95295 0.0349 0.7186 
 
 
